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Why Is Africa Constrained from Spending ODA?
Attaining the MDGs in sub-Saharan Africa calls for a dramatic
scaling up of Official Development Assistance. Yet governments
have been constrained from spending the bulk of aid received in
recent years. If aid cannot be spent, donors might ask: why give it?
A better question is: what is preventing the spending?
A recent report by the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF,
“The IMF and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa” supplies part of the answer.
Governments in low-income countries bound by an IMF Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) spent, on average, only 28 per
cent of their ODA receipts during 1999-2005. If their inflation rates
exceeded five per cent, they spent, on average, only 15 per cent.
Inflation has been a preeminent concern for the IMF. A five per cent
inflation threshold has been the trigger for its decisions about
whether countries could spend aid or not. In other words,
safeguarding macroeconomic stability—restrictively defined—has
taken precedence over spending ODA.
What has been the IMF’s justification? It has argued that ODA-
financed government spending on domestic goods and services
(not traded internationally) would outstrip their domestic supply.
This would drive up the general price level and appreciate the
country’s exchange rate, damaging exports and economic growth.
Yet, IMF’s own research suggests that inflation rates of 5-10 per
cent in Africa are not likely to harm growth. The IMF also now
recognizes that adverse supply shocks (such as spikes in oil or food
prices) could temporarily drive inflation above 10 per cent. Other
credible research has found that the threshold below which
inflation remains benign is 15 per cent, or even higher.
In contrast to the experience of some other regions, Africa has not
experienced, on average, severe bouts of inflation. In the 1980s, its
average inflation was below 25 per cent, and never exceeded 30
per cent. Beginning in 1994, its inflation plummeted, remaining
anchored between five and 10 per cent during the PRGF years of
1999-2005 (See Graph). Similarly, its average fiscal deficit shrank
rapidly: from about seven per cent of GDP in 1994 to almost two
per cent in 1997. By 2005, it was a little less than two per cent.
When ODA to Africa began to increase in recent years, the IMF was
not prepared to reverse gears on targeting such low inflation rates.
Fiscal deficits (excluding grant financing) should have been
increasing, not decreasing, in response to an upsurge of ODA.
Instead, central banks channeled ODA into paying off domestic
debt—including government debt held by central banks.
IMF practice has not kept pace with its own theory. In line with the
logic of macroeconomic accounting, the IMF has recently asserted
that the ideal scenario in response to a scaling up of ODA is that it
be fully spent and ‘absorbed’. In other words, not only should the
government fully spend the domestic currency equivalent of ODA
but also the central bank should eventually sell the corresponding
ODA-supplied foreign exchange in order to facilitate greater imports
(i.e., ‘absorption’). Otherwise, ODA would not end up financing the
transfer of additional real resources into the economy.
If ODA is not converted into payments for imports, it has to become
a financial claim on foreign assets (either central bank foreign-
exchange reserves or privately owned assets abroad). The same
evaluation cited above finds that only 63 per cent of ODA was
‘absorbed’; the remaining 37 per cent was used to accumulate
foreign-exchange reserves or fuel private capital outflows. Just
during 1999-2005, reserves in Africa increased from about three
per cent of GDP to about 4.5 per cent. While using ODA to initially
accumulate a modest cover of international reserves might make
sense (especially in the face of future aid volatility), excessively
stockpiling reserves implies that the central bank is undercutting
the purpose of aid, namely, to transfer real resources into a country.
An overriding problem is that the monetary policy of central banks
can often place tight restrictions on the scope of government fiscal
policies. If central bank inflation targets are set below five per cent,
governments are reluctant to spend ODA because of the fear of
accelerating inflation above that threshold. They are also reluctant to
widen fiscal deficits in order to increase MDG-related expenditures—
even when such widening is financed by grants. And when the
central bank does not sell reserves, it has to ‘sterilize’ the monetary
impact of aid by selling government securities. This tends to drive
up the real rate of interest and undercut fiscal expansion.
For ODA to have its full impact on expanding MDG-related
expenditures, fiscal policies and monetary policies need to be
coordinated. Fiscal policies should ensure that ODA is fully spent while
monetary policies should ensure that ODA is fully absorbed. But under
current policy regimes dominated by central banks, the role of fiscal
policies has been no more glorified than containing deficits.
Such a regime has erected an imposing MDG roadblock. MDG-
oriented development strategies clearly rely on more expansionary
(ODA-financed) fiscal policies. Much of the increase in ODA will have
to expand public investment to build more schools, health clinics,
maternity wards, rural roads and irrigation systems. So, monetary
policies should accommodate more expansionary fiscal policies.
Instead, restrictive ‘inflation-focused’ monetary policies are
currently blocking the fiscal expansion necessary for progress
on the MDGs in Africa.
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